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10 Issues in Korean 
Exchange Rate Policy 
Stanley W. Black 
10.1 Introduction 
As a medium-sized, rapidly industrializing country that has just joined the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Korea 
faces a number of unique problems that affect its exchange rate policy. Among 
these are its asymmetric competitive position vis-8-vis Japan, which is both its 
major supplier of machine tools and a leading competitor in third markets; 
the current policy of financial liberalization that goes along with democratic 
liberalization; and the implications of the potential future unification of the 
Korean peninsula. The role of Japan as supplier and competitor makes the 
widely fluctuating yen-dollar exchange rate a key determinant of Korean com- 
petitiveness and terms of trade. Financial liberalization is introducing capital 
flows as a major factor in exchange rate determination. And the impact of Ger- 
man unification on the European Monetary System (EMS) has raised many 
questions about the potential future effects of Korean unification. This paper 
will seek to explore these issues. 
In the late 1980s, Korean exchange rate policy faced a situation called the 
“three blessings” or “three lows”: low yen-dollar rate, low oil prices, and low 
world interest rates. The first of these gave Korea an export stimulus, the sec- 
ond reduced the cost of energy imports, and the third lowered the cost of ser- 
vicing external debt. The major issue at the time was how to prevent this wind- 
fall from causing an unsustainable inflationary boom and whether to allow the 
won to appreciate or to repay external debt. 
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In a controversial move, the Korean government adopted a policy to repay 
much of its external debt, based on the assumption that the “three lows” were 
a temporary windfall. Balassa and Williamson (1987) argued at the time that 
appreciation of the won to reduce the external surplus was a more appropriate 
response, since it would permit additional domestic investment. Cho (1995) 
has supported this position with simulations indicating a much higher invest- 
ment path if external debt had not been repaid. 
Korea must have lived a charmed life, since until recently the world environ- 
ment again wore some of the same beneficial aspects, including a low yen- 
dollar rate, low oil prices, and low interest rates. On the other hand, the low 
yen-dollar rate was one of a number of factors depressing the Japanese econ- 
omy, an important market for Korea. Since mid-1995, however, the yen-dollar 
rate has risen significantly, removing some of the export stimulus. And oil 
prices have also rjsen from their lows of late 1995, while long-term interest 
rates have rebounded from their lows of early 1996. And different from 1988, 
competition from China and other Asian competitor nations is beginning to raise 
concerns for Korean policymakers. Financial market liberalization is a new fac- 
tor affecting both the value of the won and the Korean balance of payments. 
This paper will consider the question of the appropriate exchange rate policy 
for Korea in the face of fluctuations in the yen-dollar rate, increasing competi- 
tion from lower cost Asian countries, and financial liberalization. Section 10.2 
discusses the main exchange rate policy issues for Korea, dealing with external 
versus internal targets, choice of external comparison basket, and the effects 
of financial liberalization. Section 10.3 considers the issue of regional currency 
areas. Section 10.4 discusses Korean unification, and section 10.5 concludes 
with long-run equilibrium. 
10.2 Fundamentals of Exchange Rate Policy 
10.2.1 Internal versus External Objectives 
The exchange rate defines the external purchasing power of a nation’s cur- 
rency. It is essential that this external purchasing power be consistent in the 
long run with the currency’s internal purchasing power. Maintenance of the 
purchasing power of the nation’s currency is the fundamental responsibility of 
the central bank or monetary authority. As is well known, there are two ap- 
proaches to this fundamental problem. 
The internal target approach consists in the central bank‘s defining and 
maintaining a rate of growth of the money supply that is consistent with price 
stability, defined as a low and stable rate of inflation. The exchange rate is not 
in this case a target for monetary policy, but simply an instrument that is con- 
trolled to ensure consistency between the internal and external purchasing 
power of the currency. This ensures the competitiveness of domestic exporters 
in international markets. 
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The external target approach involves setting a fixed exchange rate with a 
relatively stable currency, usually that of a large trading partner, and using the 
external price level to anchor domestic prices. In this case monetary policy- 
makers must act to keep domestic interest rates aligned with foreign rates and 
orient all policy instruments to maintaining the exchange rate. In case domestic 
inflationary factors cause the exchange rate to become overvalued, devaluation 
to restore competitiveness is required. 
The choice between these two methods of monetary control and exchange 
rate policy depends on the relative importance of flexibility in the exchange 
rate and credibility gained by anchoring the domestic price level to world 
prices through a fixed exchange rate. This problem has been formalized by 
Devarajan and Rodrik (1991) in the context of a Barro-Gordon model (1983) 
of an open economy subject to terms-of-trade shocks. The central bank's credi- 
bility is in question because it has an output target that exceeds the level consis- 
tent with stable prices. Price and wage setters must choose their behavior be- 
fore knowing the terms-of-trade shock or the current exchange rate. The central 
bank has two choices. It may commit itself to a fixed exchange rate, which 
prevents it from offsetting the terms-of-trade shock and from inflating to ex- 
ploit the prior setting of wages and prices so as to achieve a lower unemploy- 
ment rate. Or it may adopt a flexible rate to offset terms-of-trade shocks, which 
then allows it to indulge in inflationary behavior as well. 
If the central bank has relatively strong anti-inflation credibility, it will not 
be tempted to inflate when given the option by flexibility. In this case, the 
flexible rate option will allow use of the exchange rate to offset terms-of-trade 
shocks without paying a cost in terms of higher inflation. However, if the cen- 
tral bank's credibility is low, this option is best forgone, in order to avoid the 
inflationary consequences. 
What is the empirical evidence on the choice between pegged and flexible 
rates? Edwards (1993) has shown that countries with previous experience of 
low inflation may be able to use a fixed exchange rate to keep their inflation 
low. But those with high inflation may not be able to gain credibility simply by 
fixing the exchange rate. 
Edwards (1996; chap. 1 in this volume) argues that political instability short- 
ens the time horizon of the authorities and reduces their willingness to under- 
take necessary devaluations. The second factor makes a peg less attractive, 
while the first has ambiguous effects. His regressions incorporate political in- 
stability (measured as change in government), variability of external shocks, 
central bank credibility, and ability to sustain a peg with reserves. The findings 
confirm the importance of the economic and political factors. 
It appears that high credibility and high variance of external shocks both 
contribute to a choice in favor of flexibility, as Deverajan and Rodrik argue. 
Political instability also contributes to the choice of a flexible rate, suggesting 
that the unwillingness to devalue may be important. 
Considering a different aspect of credibility, countries with independent 
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central banks are found to have better records in controlling inflation than 
countries with central banks under direct government control (Cukierman, 
Webb, and Neyapti 1993). But Japan and Korea are both exceptions to these 
findings, since they have managed to achieve relatively low inflation without 
requiring their central banks to be formally independent. 
The implications of these conclusions for Korea point in the direction of 
flexibility, it seems to me. One may argue that external shocks coming from 
the fluctuating yen-dollar rate will remain important. The central bank has es- 
tablished a significant degree of credibility. Governments are more likely to 
change in the future than they have in the past. 
Korea’s choices. For Korea, the choice among these options has evolved gradu- 
ally (see table 10.1). During the Bretton Woods era, the external target ap- 
proach was the universally chosen option. When floating exchange rates began, 
Korea continued to peg its exchange rate to the U.S. dollar during much of the 
1970s. Since domestic inflation was not under control, occasional devaluations 
were necessary to keep the external purchasing power of the won in line with 
its falling internal purchasing power. But when the dollar began its radical 
appreciation during the 1980s, Korea shifted to a managed basket peg to keep 
the won from being pulled up with the dollar. 
According to Oum and Cho (1995), in the 1980s Korea followed a policy of 
changing the exchange rate to adjust the current account, which is influenced 
by the exchange rate with a substantial lag, as in most countries. Since the 
Korean current account is heavily influenced by fluctuations in the yen-dollar 
rate, this set up a lagged feedback from the cycle in the yen-dollar rate to the 
won that caused the current account to fluctuate widely. 
As the yen appreciated in the late 1980s after the Plaza Agreement, Korea’s 
surplus grew, leading to appreciation of the won. By 1988 the yen peaked and 
began to depreciate, while the won kept appreciating as the surplus continued, 
despite the worsening of the underlying competitive position. Domestic invest- 
ment increased moderately at first but then took off in an unsustainable boom 
in 1990-91, as the current account shifted into deficit. 
In response to the exaggerated fluctuations of the won, the government in 
1990 adopted a new exchange rate policy called the “market average rate” 
system. The most appropriate description of this shift appears to be from a 
Table 10.1 Korean Exchange Rate Regimes 
Period Regime Characteristics 
1955-72 Bretton Woods era Inflation/devaluations 
1973-79 Pegged to U.S. dollar Inflation/devaluations 
1980-89 Managed basket peg Current balance target 
1990-97 Market average rate system Stable real exchange rate 
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target-based approach, targeting the current balance, to an instrument-based 
approach, trying to stabilize the real exchange rate. It seems to have approxi- 
mately achieved stabilization of the real exchange rate, or maintenance of equi- 
librium between the external and internal values of the won, despite the fact 
that the won continued to follow the movements of the dollar more closely 
than the yen. (See Takagi, chap. 7 in this volume, and Frankel and Wei 1994) 
During the early 1980s, Korea along with several other dynamic Asian econ- 
omies took advantage of the sharp reduction of inflation in industrialized coun- 
tries to bring its own inflation rate under control. As a result, since that time 
Korea has had the option to use the internal target approach to control the 
purchasing power of its currency. The liberalization of financial markets that 
took place in the 1980s has changed the environment in which monetary policy 
is made in Korea. Despite an inflationary boom period in 1990-91 and contin- 
ued strong growth of the economy, the Bank of Korea has managed to hold the 
inflation rate in the neighborhood of 5 to 6 percent per year. 
In conjunction with the liberalized financial system, Korea moved in the 
direction of a market-based exchange rate policy in 1990, allowing market 
factors to move the won-dollar exchange rate by up to 2.25 percent per day. At 
the same time, banks and other participants in the market have been allowed 
to hold foreign currency balances to enable them to create an interbank market 
for foreign exchange. 
10.2.2 Choice of External Relationship 
In a multiple-currency world, “the” foreign exchange rate must be defined 
relative to each trading partner whose currency is used in external transactions. 
For Korea, the primary trading partners are North America, Japan, Europe, and 
other Asia. The major currencies involved would thus be the U.S. dollar, Japa- 
nese yen, and deutsche mark (as a proxy for other European currencies). Since 
these exchange rates have fluctuated sharply in recent years, Korea has been 
forced to accept significant fluctuations in traded goods prices. 
The main issue can be illustrated by the following hypothetical example. 
Assume that Korea exports only to the United States in dollars and imports 
only from Japan in yen. If e, is the won-yen exchange rate and e, is the won- 
dollar exchange rate, then export prices are pse, and import prices are p&,. The 
terms of trade will then be p,e,/p,e, = p&,e,, where e ,  is the yen-dollar 
exchange rate. If dollar prices and yen prices remain relatively stable, the terms 
of trade will fluctuate with the yen-dollar exchange rate, no matter what hap- 
pens to e, or e,. This is the key problem for Korea. Only if the yen-dollar rate 
follows purchasing power parity will Korea be unaffected by its fluctuations. 
If Korea pegs to the dollar, its import prices will then fluctuate with the yen- 
dollar rate, while export prices are stable. If it pegs to the yen, its export prices 
will fluctuate with the yen-dollar rate, while import prices are stable. 
Choosing a basketpeg enables Korea to balance its competing interests and 
minimize the fluctuation of traded goods prices. Define the basket as 
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Then pegging to the basket sets 
where a$, a%, and a,, are the weights applied to the dollar, the yen, and the 
deutsche mark (or European currency) exchange rates. 
The weights are normally chosen to minimize the impact of the resulting 
fluctuations on the foreign currency value of the balance of trade. Assume that 
the export and import shares of the dollar, yen, and deutsche mark are wi and vi 
for i = $, Y ,  dm. Using the traditional model for exports and imports would put 
a, = [E(qf - 1)/(E + q')]w, + v,q, 
where q and qf are the domestic and foreign elasticities of demand for imports 
and E is the domestic elasticity of supply of exports (assuming E' is infinite for 
a small country). If qf = 2.5, q = 0.7, and E = 2 for Korea (Kwack 1986), this 
would give weights approximately equal to the trade shares of the dollar, yen, 
and mark, or (using 1994 trade shares) 39 percent for the dollar, 36 percent for 
the yen, 25 percent for the mark. 
On the other hand, with $30 billion worth of foreign exchange reserves, 
Korea may not have to worry about the availability of foreign currency. Weights 
that would minimize the impact on the domestic currency value of the balance 
of trade would limit effects on domestic output and employment. In this case, 
the weights should be 
ai = [(l + E)qf/(& + q')]wi + (1 - q)vi,  
which would imply weights of 43 percent for the dollar, 32 percent for the yen, 
and 25 percent for the mark. The larger role for the dollar under the domestic 
currency criterion reflects the greater importance of dollar markets for domes- 
tic currency export receipts, which have a higher elasticity than domestic cur- 
rency import payments. 
What this analysis omits is the impact of competing suppliers in the export 
market, which for Korea would be Japan and the other Asian industrializing 
countries, mainly Taiwan and Hong Kong. Including competitors would in- 
crease the weight on the yen and add Taiwan and Hong Kong to the basket. 
For the past 10 years, Hong Kong and Taiwan have both pegged their curren- 
cies very closely to the U.S. dollar. So the result would be to add to the weights 
of both the yen and the dollar in the basket, with perhaps little effect on the 
overall proportions (see Williamson 1995). 
Even if Korea chooses not to peg its currency, the basket represents the 
appropriate basis for comparison of the movements of the external and domes- 
tic purchasing power of the won. Figure 10.1 shows the OECD's measures of 
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nominal effective exchange rates of the won and related currencies. An inverse 
correlation will be noticed for most of the currencies relative to the movements 
of the Japanese yen. This reflects the degree to which their dollar pegs, espe- 
cially during the 1980s, moved their currencies relative to the yen. 
Figure 10.2 shows the corresponding real effective exchange rates, including 
my calculations for the bilateral Chinese yuan-dollar rate. During the 1980s 
most of the East Asian currencies moved inversely to the yen in real as well as 
nominal terms. In the 1990s, however, the Hong Kong and Singapore dollars 
have appreciated more in real terms than the Taiwan dollar, the won, or the 
yuan, which except for the latter have been relatively stable in real terms. 
Figure 10.3 indicates the behavior of the won, in real and nominal terms, 
along with prices, as measured relative to consumer prices in industrial coun- 
tries. From the perspective of stability in the real exchange rate, the market 
average rate system appears to be performing rather well. Put differently, the 
external value of the won is conforming more closely to its internal value. 
10.2.3 Financial Liberalization 
In July 1993 the Government of Korea announced a seven-year plan for 
liberalization of the financial sector of the economy (Park 1993). The major 
factors include gradually deregulating all interest rates except deposit rates by 
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1997, eliminating government influence over bank lending operations, encour- 
aging the development of competition and new financial instruments, and lib- 
eralizing the foreign exchange market and capital flows. The purpose of this 
program is to use the financial markets to improve the efficiency with which 
financial resources are channeled to investment. In conjunction with this re- 
form, the “real name” system was implemented in 1993, requiring all accounts 
to bear the real name of the holder. These major reforms are having important 
repercussions on the Korean economy and society. The tight network of per- 
sonal relationships that has characterized the partnership between business and 
government is being replaced with more impersonal market-based relation- 
ships and explicit regulations. 
The impact of financial liberalization on the foreign exchange market is sig- 
nificant. Kenen (1993) argues that the primary external effect of a credible 
liberalization of domestic financial markets in a developing country will be 
substantial capital inflow, leading to appreciation of the real exchange rate. He 
treats the existence of capital controls as equivalent to a tax on exporting capi- 
tal. Liberalization eliminates the tax now and in the future. Thus capital inflow 
comes in response to the removal of the threat of future taxation of domestic 
financial assets. If the exchange rate is pegged, such capital inflows will require 
sterilization of large reserve inflows. If the exchange rate is floating, substantial 
nominal appreciation will occur. 
But appreciation in response to capital inflow is only one possibility. Sup- 
pose that the capital controls limit both foreigners who wish to import capital 
and Koreans who wish to invest abroad. Their removal then leads to substantial 
portfolio diversification by both foreigners and domestic residents and a sharp 
increase in both capital inflows and outflows, with little impact on the exchange 
rate. According to Korean balance-of-payments data, both capital inflows and 
capital outflows have increased sharply since the liberalization of the financial 
sector in 1993. In the Korean context, the adoption of the real name system 
could itself lead to capital outflow. If formerly confidential transactions are 
now exposed to the authorities, in future such transactions would have to be 
carried out offshore to remain unknown to the authorities. 
In actuality, the real (and nominal) exchange rate of the Korean won has 
appreciated since the beginning of the 1993-97 liberalization of financial mar- 
kets. The reasons for this behavior are probably found more in the capital ac- 
count than in the current account. During the period 1987-89, the influence of 
the cunent account on exchange rate policy was so strong that Korea’s ex- 
change rate appreciated strongly at the same time that reserves grew sharply 
and external debt was repaid. Then the external windfall temporarily disap- 
peared with the rise in petroleum prices, interest rates, and the yen value of the 
dollar during the Gulf War crisis in 1989-90. Strong real wage growth during 
an inflationary boom provided internal stimulus. Korea’s current account 
quickly turned negative, and the exchange rate depreciated in real terms during 
the period 1991-93. Thus the capital inflows, far from being a problem for 
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monetary management, were welcome financing for the current account deficit 
(Folkerts-Landau et al. 1995). 
Associated with the program of financial liberalization is a substantial liber- 
alization of the foreign exchange market itself, permitting banks, firms, and 
individuals to hold foreign currencies more freely and to make transactions 
more freely (Kim 1994). Also, the permitted daily fluctuation of the won has 
been gradually increased, moving in the direction of a freely floating system. 
This does not mean, however, that intervention will be avoided, as foreign ex- 
change reserves have increased by $14.5 billion since July 1993, in response 
to strong net capital inflows. 
10.2.4 Limiting the Rate of Capital Inflow 
A range of policies may be considered in the effort to keep capital inflows 
from overwhelming domestic exchange rate and monetary policies (Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund 1995). Keeping the exchange rate flexible will impose 
some costs on risk-averse investors and thereby limit capital mobility. Taxing 
the interest earnings of foreign investors will also limit the inflow of capital. 
Equivalently, the authorities may impose reserve requirements on foreign capi- 
tal inflows. Intervention in the foreign exchange market will limit the impact 
of capital inflows on the exchange rate, which if unsterilized will lead to an 
increase in the domestic money supply. Some amount of sterilized intervention 
can also be used, at the cost of the interest paid on the bonds issued to soak up 
the increase in liquidity. Finally, the authorities could simply set limits on the 
allowed amount of capital inflows of various types. This last tactic, like the 
taxes and reserve requirements, may be subject to evasion. More seriously, it 
will create rents and may lead to rent-seeking behavior, bribery, and so on. 
In summary, the best policy to limit capital inflows will be some judicious 
combination of all of the above, together with allowing some nonpredictable 
amount of exchange rate appreciation. 
10.3 Should Korea Join a Currency Area? 
One solution to some of the problems of exchange rate policy is the forma- 
tion of a currency bloc. By pegging to a single currency standard, whether that 
of a large country or of a group of like-minded countries (as in the case of the 
EMS), a country can reduce the exchange-rate-induced fluctuation in its traded 
goods prices relative to the members of the bloc. Needless to say, this makes 
sense only if the partner or partners have stable economies and inflation rates. 
For Korea, there are only two choices here, either pegging to a basket in- 
cluding its major markets, such as Japan, the United States, and Europe, or 
pegging together with a group of competitors, such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia. The first possibility would essentially re- 
quire Korea to choose between stability of traded goods prices and the ability 
to respond to external shocks, as discussed above. While this option could min- 
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imize the variability of traded goods prices, it would not eliminate the terms- 
of-trade fluctuations noted earlier. 
The second possibility would require a group of diverse competitors at dif- 
ferent levels of development to agree on exchange rate policy and therefore on 
monetary policy over an extended period of time. It is already clear that these 
countries face significantly different economic policy problems and have cho- 
sen different exchange rate policies in the past. The Hong Kong dollar has 
been pegged to the U.S. dollar since 1984, while both Taiwan and Singapore 
have steadily appreciated, Singapore much faster. In addition, Korea’s financial 
liberalization is proceeding on its own schedule, independent of the other 
Asian industrializing countries. 
The feasibility of a currency area also depends on the degree of symmetry 
of the shocks expected to hit the various member countries. Contemplating the 
potential members is not reassuring on this score. South Korea will someday 
have to adjust to reunification with North Korea. Hong Kong is facing reinte- 
gration with China and its own entirely different set of structural adjustments. 
Taiwan continues to face the threat of attempts to reintegrate it into China. 
Thailand and Malaysia are at different stages in the development process from 
Korea. Reviewing these issues indicates the advantages of an independent ex- 
change rate policy for Korea, for the foreseeable future. 
This does not, however, rule out the usefulness of increased monetary coop- 
eration in East Asia. With growing capital mobility and the potential for exter- 
nal financial shocks to spill over into Asian markets, coordinated strategies for 
responding to external shocks could be attractive. Coordinated responses to 
wide fluctuations in the yen-dollar rate could help avoid the extent of fluctua- 
tions in real exchange rates that took place in the late 1980s. 
10.4 Implications of Korean Unification 
When and if Korea reunites, it will face major structural readjustment prob- 
lems. The example of German unification suggests that such a large real shock 
may be more easily adjusted to with a flexible rate. While the full implications 
of reunification are beyond the scope of this paper, it is at least clear that there 
would be a large demand for new investment to enlarge the capital stock of 
North Korea, both public and private. Such a large demand shock might also be 
accompanied by a negative supply shock, if Korea were to follow Germany’s 
example and raise wages in the north without any corresponding increase in 
productivity. The net excess demand shock would require a contractionary fis- 
cal response. If this were not provided, as it was not in Germany, then tight 
monetary policy would be needed to prevent inflation. The real interest rate 
would rise, and the real exchange rate would appreciate at once, then depreci- 
ate gradually over time in keeping with uncovered interest rate parity. The size 
of the net excess demand shock and the implied exchange rate effect could be 
reduced by more appropriate fiscal policy and wage policy. 
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10.5 Long-Run Equilibrium 
In an economy like Korea, where per capita incomes and real wages are 
rising strongly over time, one major factor affecting the equilibrium real ex- 
change rate is the rising relative price of nontraded goods, as domestic labor 
becomes more expensive. Thus the real exchange rate would be expected to 
appreciate over time as traded goods become relatively cheaper. 
The other major factor is the increased attractiveness of Korean real and 
financial assets, both to foreigners and to Koreans themselves, as rates of return 
continue to be high and the economy becomes increasingly integrated with the 
rest of the world. This will also tend to appreciate the real value of the currency, 
offset to some degree as Korean firms and individuals diversify their asset 
holdings abroad. Particularly evident here is the drive of Korean chaebol to 
establish overseas operations as part of the process of globalization. 
However, structural weaknesses can limit the rate of real appreciation, be- 
cause of the negative effect it has on the Korean current account. Currently, 
Korea has been losing market share in the United States to Asian developing 
countries, offsetting this with sales gains in rapidly growing Asian markets. 
Among several problems with this process are the increasing tendency of Ko- 
rean firms to move production to other Asian markets and the continued reli- 
ance of Korean firms on imports of Japanese machinery for expansion. Unless 
Korea can overcome these weaknesses, its ability to resume a healthy path of 
gradual real appreciation will be in question. 
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Comment Chong-Hyun Nam 
Black has written an excellent paper on the question of appropriate exchange 
rate policy for Korea. In addressing this delicate subject, he carefully examines 
the past experience of Korea’s exchange rate policy as well as recent develop- 
ments in its external economic conditions. 
My comment will be very brief. Rather than repeating Black‘s conclusions, 
with which I agree, I will focus on one issue that I think requires more elabora- 
tion. The issue that I want to raise is: how can one detect and measure the 
existence of misalignment in the exchange rate for a small semiopen economy 
like Korea? Should we look at movements in the current account balance? Or 
the overall balance? Or some modified purchasing power parity indexes like 
the one Black has suggested in his paper? 
In the past, up until the late 1970s, the Korean authorities looked more care- 
fully at export performance for detecting a misalignment in exchange rate than 
at Performance in the current account balance per se. They did so because the 
capital account was under the government’s tight control, and thus the current 
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account balance was for the most part the intended one at the time. For in- 
stance, it was customary for the Korean government to make a long-term in- 
vestment plan to ensure a desired level of output growth and then calculate the 
expected shortage in domestic savings. Then the government went out to bor- 
row from abroad to fill the expected domestic savings-investment gap. 
In the early 1980s, however, the Korean government began to restrain itself 
from intervening in resource allocation as well as in financing domestic invest- 
ments. At the same time, the exchange rate system moved from a virtual peg 
to the U.S. dollar to a currency basket pegging system, which is classified as 
managed floating by the IMF’s definition. During the 1980s, therefore, deter- 
mination of the exchange rate was still under the government’s discretionary 
control, and the government looked more carefully at movement in the current 
account balance in making any judgment on exchange rate misalignment. 
But much confusion began to arise starting in the early 1990s, especially 
with the economy in a transitional period with ongoing capital market liberal- 
ization under the so-called market average rate system, which is virtually a 
floating exchange rate system. Problems arise mainly because both the current 
account balance and export performance tend to be affected in significant ways 
by the speed and scope of domestic capital market liberalization for both in- 
bound and outbound flows. Furthermore, export performance can readily affect 
the economic growth rate, which is a priority concern for policymakers in Ko- 
rea. Thus the appropriate exchange rate policy has become an inseparable issue 
from the policy of capital market liberalization in Korea. A major question 
rests on whether the overshooting effects of capital market liberalization 
should be and could be contained by government intervention in the exchange 
market, and if so, whether with sterilization or not? Much study needs to be 
done on these issues, I believe. 
COITUllellt Baekin Cha 
I am glad to have the honor of discussing Black’s clear and forthright paper. I 
should merely like to elaborate on one of his points-the effects of financial 
liberalization. 
Black is very right to tell us that the impact of financial liberalization on the 
foreign exchange market in Korea will be significant. Among many macroeco- 
nomic issues, the financial liberalization has been of the deepest concern to the 
business sector as well as to policymakers in Korea, and debates have been 
going on about its possible impacts on the domestic economy. On the one hand, 
financial liberalization and the likely capital inflow can be a contributing factor 
to further economic growth through (1) enhancement of international competi- 
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tiveness of Korean exports resulting from a reduction in business firms' general 
financial costs and ( 2 )  an increase in domestic investment resulting from a fall 
in domestic interest rates. On the other hand, massive capital inflow may lead 
to an appreciation of the real exchange rate of the Korean won, which would 
reduce the competitiveness of Korean exports and worsen current account im- 
balances. Given the well-known export-oriented characteristic of the Korean 
economy, such appreciation could easily be channeled to the domestic business 
cycle in a negative way. 
Black is also right to say that appreciation in response to capital inflow is 
only one possibility. As he points out, if the removal of capital controls leads 
to equal increases in capital inflow and outflow, there would be little impact on 
the exchange rate. Although it is true that capital outflow also increased sharply 
after 1993, it seems doubtful that the magnitude and the trend of capital out- 
flow could counterbalance those of the obviously huge inflow in the future, 
given the chronic excess demand for funds, the relatively high domestic in- 
terest rate, and the degree of current government regulations on investment 
abroad by domestic residents. 
In response to the expected strong net capital inflow, a real policy question 
will then be whether there should or should not be foreign exchange market 
intervention, and if there should, what type of intervention will minimize the 
aforementioned negative impacts. 
If the Bank of Korea does not intervene at all in the foreign exchange mar- 
ket, the exchange rate will carry all the burden of adjustment. The positive 
effect will be easier monetary control, which contributes to price stabilization, 
but the negative effects will entail appreciation and the resulting lower interna- 
tional competitiveness of Korean exports and current account imbalance. 
If the Bank of Korea intervenes, there can be two cases. First, if the bank 
adopts a sterilized intervention policy by issuing monetary stabilization bonds 
to absorb the portion of money supply increased by the purchase of foreign 
exchange, the exchange rate will remain stable and the impact on export com- 
petitiveness and the current account balance will be minimized. But this policy 
will necessarily be accompanied by sterilization costs. For example, at the end 
of June 1998, the outstanding balance of monetary stabilization bonds was 
42.4 trillion won and the interest payment was 2.5 trillion won. 
Second, if the Bank of Korea chooses nonsterilized intervention, the positive 
effects will be a stabilized exchange rate, a reduction in domestic interest rates, 
and no sterilization cost. But the negative effects will be more difficult man- 
agement of the domestic money supply and, more important, inflation. 
The choice among the above seems the most imminent and important deci- 
sion that the Korean policymakers must make. While Black's paper is a very 
useful study covering a wide range of issues related to Korean exchange rate 
policy, I believe additional benefit could have been gained if it had provided a 
more detailed opinion regarding the intervention policy issue. 
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